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Diffused Surface Water
Problems and a Current
of Anomalous Remedies
Introduction
Some of the surface effects of mineral development are
dramatic and immediate. These effects are perhaps most graph-
ically demonstrated by viewing strip mining methods and results.
Other effects are more insidious, developing unnoticed over time,
but with end results that are equally dramatic. One of the most
highly publicized of these "hidden" effects of mineral develop-
ment is subsidence.
While subsidence effects are well documented, another hid-
den effect of mining has received less attention. The long term
changes in drainage patterns caused by mineral developement have
received little attention compared to that focused on subsidence,
yet the large scale impact on the environment and on landowners
may be even greater.
Minerals cannot be developed without some changes in the
surface and subsurface geological strata. Developers construct
roads, dig mines, bore holes, and create sedimentation ponds
and brine discharge areas. All of these actions result in some
changes, ranging from subtle to severe, in the area's natural
drainage patterns. While the major emphasis of water legislation
in Kentucky and most other states is on regulating consumptive
use,' this note will focus on the opposite problem - the drainage
or disposal of water.2
E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ch. 151 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KRSJ.
2 See Maloney & Plager, Diffuse Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 72 (1968); Beck, The Law of Drainage, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
450.1 (R. Clark ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978).
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Changes in drainage patterns can cause injury to adjoining,
and even far removed, landowners.' This problem is particularly
important because the injured party is very often someone who
was not a party to the mineral lease, and who received no
compensation when the minerals were extracted. Nonetheless,
injury from drainage does not stop at the boundaries of the
leased property, and prudent developers are well advised to
consider what measures must be taken to reduce or eliminate
liability to surrounding landowners when those landowners are
adversely affected by changed drainage patterns.
Acting as a prudent developer, however, is not an easy task
because drainage law has not generated any clear standards of
compliance. Different jurisdictions have developed different ap-
proaches to drainage law, with some states even applying differ-
ent standards to metropolitan and rural areas. In some.
jurisdictions, a developer may engage without compunction in
almost any activity, regardless of the effect on drainage patterns,
while in other areas a developer is subject to "reasonableness"
and/or negligence standards. In still other jurisdictions, a rea-
sonable, non-negligent developer may be held strictly liable for
any harm from changes in natural drainage patterns.
This note surveys the many legal theories that have been
applied to drainage law and the judicial remedies available under
those theories. When these theories are put into a modern con-
text, it becomes apparent that theories which are flexible for the
injured landowner, yet which still offer reasonable, determinable
standards of conduct, are needed to protect landowners without
stifling development.
However, even where a state has instituted an appropriate
judicial model for handling surface water problems, federal acts
and local ordinances may supplement, or even pre-empt, the
judicial response. As a result, the courts must apply a test for
drainage liability that is not only flexible enough to track the
changes in a modern society, but will also work in concert with
surface water legislation. Similarly, legislation must be drafted
to recognize the already existing judicial theories governing sur-
face water disputes.
I Beck, supra note 2, at § 450.2.
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I. PROBLEMS OF WATER CLASSIFICATION
Classification is the first important step in understanding
drainage law.4 Since different doctrines govern in different cir-
cumstances, a variety of legal results are reached, depending on
the particular water classification that is applied.5 The traditional
legal water classifications are: (1) groundwater, 6 (2) natural water-
courses,7 lakes and ponds,' and (3) diffused surface waters. 9 This
third category-diffused surface water-is the main focus in
drainage law.
Defining diffused surface water is difficult because scientific
and legal classifications of water are not consistent with each
other. Hydrologists view all water as passing through different
phases of one endless hydrological cycle.' 0 The cycle begins with
rain, the greatest source of surface water. More than two thirds
of the rain that falls is evapotranspired" into the atmosphere;
the remainder flows into watercourses,' 2 lakes or ponds, perco-
lates through soil to become groundwater, 3 or moves over the
land as diffused surface water until it too evaporates, or reaches
a body of water.
4
4 The legal profession, to the chagrin of the scientific community, appears to
ignore the concept of water flowing in a cycle.
I Beck, supra note 2, at § 450.5. For criticism of legal classifications of water
see, THOMAS, THE CONSERVATION OF GROUND WATER 248 (1951).
6 See Clark, Classes of Water and Character of Water Rights and Uses, I WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967 & Supp. 1978).
Id. § 52.1(B).
Id. § 52.1(D).
See id. § 52.1(A); see also Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 74 where the
authors note "the main characteristic of surface water in contrast with a lake is its inability
to maintain its identity and existence as a water body. Therefore, puddles and 'ponds'
with no outlet and which exist only in times of heavy rainfall are surface water."
1o Clark, Plan and Scope of the Work, I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 2.4 (R.
Clark ed. 1967 & Supp. 1978).
See Clark, supra note 6, at § 50.
See id. § 52-1(B) (a watercourse is water flowing in a definite channel with a bed
and banks or sides).
" See id. § 52.2 (groundwater is defined as an underground stream, percolating water,
or aquifer).
" Bower, Some Physical, Technological, and Economic Characteristics of Water
and Water Resources Systems: Implications for Administration, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J.
215, 218-19 (1963); Clark, supra note 10, at § 3.1.
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According to the legal classification, diffused surface water
(surface water) occurs when falling rain, melting snow, and water
that surfaces from underground springs remains pooled on the
land's surface." Surface water remains in a diffused state as
long as it is not a part of a defined watercourse or body of
water, other than a mere bog or marsh. 6 There are two main
problems with the legal classifications of surface waters.
First, courts often do not clearly state what properties water
must have to be classified as "surface water.' ' 7 Indeed, at times
the courts seem more concerned with the water's source than
with the properties of the water. For example, cases arising under
water damage insurance policies have defined damage caused by
accumulation of rainfall as surface water damage, while damage
caused by water from a stream which overflows because of
rainfall is termed flood damage. 8 Due to the ambiguity in the
court's attitude, it is necessary to determine the source of any
surface water before an analysis can proceed.
Second, determining the point where water ceases to be
diffused surface water and becomes part of a natural watercourse
presents a factual problem. In Withers v. Berea College, 9 the
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 846 (1979) defines surface water as "water
from rain, melting snow, springs, or seepage, or detached from subsiding floods, that
lies or flows on the surface of the earth but does not form a part of a watercourse or
lake." See Sullivan v. Hoffman, 296 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Neb. 1980); Maloney & Plager,
supra note 2, at 72.
" Enderson v. Kelehan, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Minn. 1948); MALONEY, PLAGER,
AUSNESS & CANTER, FLORIDA WATER LAW 588 (1980).
" MALONEY, PLACER, AUSNESS & CANTER, supra note 16, at 588-89. When the
courts do make classifications, the resulting categories may merely muddy the water.
For example, water which overflows the banks of a natural watercourse or lake, yet
remains connected to the stream or lake, or follows a defined path into another body,
is not surface water. On the other hand, flood waters which lose their connection with
a defined water source are considered surface waters. Id.
E.g., Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., 274 N.W. 658, 659-60 (S.D. 1937).
349 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1961). In this case, a property owner alleged that a dam
built by Berea College wrongfully caused the nearby Cowbell Creek to dry up during the
summer months. Id. at 358. If the court had recognized the creek as a watercourse, the
plaintiff would have been able to recover damages under the riparian theory. Beck, supra
note 2, at § 451.2(E). The riparian theory allows recovery if a landowner appropriates
a watercourse. Id. Since no Kentucky law regulated or allowed recovery for consumptive
use of surface waters, the effect of the court's ruling in Withers was to deny the plaintiffs
a cause of action. Withers, 349 S.W.2d at 358; see also Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and
Water Law: What Is Their Future Common Ground?, WATER RESOURCES AND Ta LAW
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court explained that surface water becomes a watercourse at the
point where it begins to form a reasonably well defined chan-
nel-with bed and banks or sides and current-even though the
stream may be very small and water may not flow continuously.
20
The creek in Withers did not constitute a watercourse because
it was comprised only of diffused surface water that descended
from hills, hollows, and ravines during times of rain and melting
snow.
2'
The cases arising under water damage insurance policies, and
the Withers case, demonstrate the gray areas that exist in the
legal definition of surface water. These gray areas make a thor-
ough factual analysis of both the source of surface water, and
the circumstances under which the surface water is found, a
necessity. Depending upon the source and the circumstances, the
"surface water" in question may actually be something entirely
different.
II. COMMON LAW PROPERTY DOCTRINES GOVERNING
DISPOSAL OF SURFACE WATER
In addition to classification problems, there are difficulties
in determining what legal principles apply to surface waters. The
major problem is that there is little state legislation regarding
water disposal problems among private landowners. As a result,
the courts over the years have had to construct appropriate
common law rules. These rules rely heavily on conflicting Latin
maxims in arriving at three different drainage law doctrines.
22
8-9 (1958) (future implications of consumption regulation); Davis, The Law of Diffused
Surface Waters in Eastern Riparian States, 6 CONN. L. REv. 227, 229 (1973-74) (rules
governing consumption of diffused surface water in eastern states); Beck, supra note 2,
at § 451.2(E) (riparian rights for appropriation of watercourse).
2, Withers, 349 S.W.2d at 358; see also Roberts v. Hocker, 610 S.W.2d 321, 326
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (mere incidence of a channel for surface water does not establish
a watercourse).
2 349 S.W.2d at 358 (the court held that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving
that the creek was a natural watercourse).
" The maxims are: 1. Aqua currit et debet currere, ut cerrere solebat (water runs
and ought to run, as it has used to run); 2. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum
et at inferos (whose is the soil, his it is even to the skies and to the depths below);
3. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (Use your own property in such a manner as
1985]
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First, the Common Enemy rule (sometimes mistakenly re-
ferred to as the common law rule) recognizes surface water as
an enemy to fight or control as each landowner sees fit. Strictly
construed, no cause of action arises for interference with the
natural flow of water even if injury to another's property oc-
curs.
23
Second, the Civil Law rule (also known as the natural flow
rule) places a natural easement on the lower landowners for
surface water flowing in its natural course. The natural flow of
surface water cannot be repelled nor diverted to the detriment
of the upper landowner.
24
Third, the Reasonable Use rule maintains that each owner
may make reasonable use of his land even if the natural flow is
altered and causes some harm to others. However, landowners
may incur liability if the interference is deemed unreasonable. 21
A. The Common Enemy Doctrine
The Common Enemy rule is rooted in early social priorities
for land development. 26 The philosophy inherent in the early
Common Enemy rule allowed each landowner freedom to im-
prove his land as he saw fit.2 7 Since an injured landowner has
not to injure that of another) Beck, supra note 2, at § 450.4. See generally STEvENs
& HAYNES, A COLLECTION OF LATIN MAXIMS (1881); BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEOAL MAxIMs
(10th ed. 1939) (for a further discussion of these definitions).
2" Beck, supra note 2, at § 451; see also Clark, supra note 6, at § 52.1(A).
" See MALONEY, PLAGER, AUSNESS, & CANTmR, supra note 16, at 590; Clark, supra
note 6, at § 52.1(A).
21 See Beck, supra note 2, at § 452.
11 Id. § 451.1; see also Flagg v. Worcester, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 601, 603 (1860) an
early Massachusetts case wherein the court reflected:
The owners of land may improve their respective estates by cultivation, by
erecting fences on the external lines, and by the erection of buildings thereon.
All of these acts must necessarily, to some extent .... change the course and
direction of the flow of surface water, and may thereby increase the quantity
passing over an adjoining estate. But such consequences, being the necessary
and unavoidable result of the lawful appropriation of land, give not right of
action to the party supposing himself to be injured thereby.
27 Beck, supra note 2, at § 451.1. Unfortunately, a number of the courts that
adopted the Common Enemy rule mistakenly thought they were adopting the English
common law and believed that their reception statute required them to follow this
doctrine. See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Groves, 93 P. 755 (Okla. 1908).
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no right of recovery against a developing landowner, strict ap-
plication of the Common Enemy rule may lead to harsh results.
28
One commentator noted that under this rule "landowners are
encouraged to engage in contests of hydraulic engineering in
which might makes right and breach of peace is often inevita-
ble.' '
2 9
Presently, interests such as environmental concerns, public
health and safety, agriculture, and the effect drainage has on
groundwater3 ° compete for priority with land development. The
few states still employing the Common Enemy doctrine3 have
all modified the rule in some respect. The modifications generally
do not permit a landowner to discharge unreasonably large
quantities of surface water where there will be injury to an
adjoining property owner.32 The types of discharge contemplated
by the modified rule apply to most artificial channels, such as
drains, culverts, even gutters or eaves.33 Also, jurisdictions fol-
lowing the modified Common Enemy rule often require a land-
Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 78.
29 Id.
" Wiggins v. Brazil Coal and Clay Corp., 440 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982); see also Beck, supra note 2, at § 450.3.
11 E.g., Dobbs v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 416 F. Supp. 5 (E.D. Okla. 1975) (court
opinions in Oklahoma claim they are following the modified Common Enemy doctrine
but in reality may be following the Civil Law rule); Pirtle v. Opco, Inc., 601 S.W.2d
265 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ind. 1982);
Roberts v. Hocker, 610 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Delp v. Laier, 288 N.W.2d
265 (Neb. 1980) (the state purports to follow the "Common Law" rule); see also Beck,
supra note 2, at § 451.2; Note, Landowner's Right to Fight Surface Water: The
Application of the Common Enemy Doctrine in Indiana, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 481 (1983-
84).
32 E.g., Kay-Noojin Dev. Co. v. Kinzer, 65 So. 2d 510, 515 (Ala. 1953); Delp,
288 N.W.2d at 269. A criticism of the modifications is the uncertainty of determining
what is or is not an unreasonable discharge. In the absence of a strict rule of law, a
court has great discretion in weighing the facts. Therefore, from the land-use planning
point of view, it may be difficult for a developer to realize potential liabilities until he
is actually confronted with a lawsuit. This uncertainty is heightened when there are two
or more adjoining developers seeking a favorable outcome from the courts. See generally
Beck, supra note 2, at § 451.3 (critique of Common Enemy Rule).
" E.g., Delp, 288 N.W.2d at 265 (ditches, dams, and terraces are artificial means);
Bozydaj v. Plattekill, 416 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (corporation
pumping water with sump pump and discharging through a hose is artificial means).
But see Roberts, 610 S.W.2d at 327 (where defendant's artificial water channels may
carry off surface water in concentrated flow provided the water emits into a "natural
surface water channel" on his own property and he is acting without negligence).
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owner who alters natural drainage patterns to act with due care.34
Indeed, exceptions and modifications of the Common Enemy
rule approach have nearly devoured the rule itself. In Oklahoma,
for example, the rule is modified to the extent that no one is
permitted to sacrifice his neighbor's property in order to protect
his own." In effect, the modifications penalize unreasonable
discharges, but there is a presumption that the discharge is not
unreasonable.1
6
Thus, even as modified, the Common Enemy doctrine favors
developers by putting the burden of asserting and proving dam-
ages for development on the shoulders of the injured landowner.
The issue then is whether it is proper for courts to favor devel-
opers. If court opinions reflect modern trends, then it must be
recognized that current society does not emphasize a policy of
protection for development. In the words of one court, "it is
the principle of modern law that a business should bear its own
costs, burdens and expenses of its operations because they can
be distributed to the consumer through price mechanisms." 37 To
hold otherwise is to burden innocent landowners with a devel-
oper's drainage problem.
B. The Civil Law Doctrine
Adjacent landowners received kinder treatment under the
Civil Law doctrine. The Civil Law rule is founded in early
Roman law, the Napoleonic Code," and the Common Law of
England.3 9 Strictly applied, the rule does not permit any altera-
tion in the natural flow of surface waters. 40 The rule is based
on the theory that an easement exists for natural drainage be-
tween adjoining lands. Thus, a lower owner must accept the
" E.g., Roberts, 610 S.W.2d at 327; Mattoon v. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347,
1349 (Okla. 1980) (the court notes that the common enemy doctrine is modified by the
"rule of reason" principle and that diversion must be done with due regard for others).
Dobbs, 416 F. Supp. at 9.
See Beck, supra note 2, at § 451.3.
Wiggins, 440 N.E.2d at 501.
Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 76.
39 Id.
- See id.
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surface water which naturally drains onto his land, but the upper
owner may do nothing to increase that burden.
41
The rationale behind the Civil Law doctrine is that main-
taining natural drainage is the least disruptive way to dispose of
surface water. Thus, each landowner takes the land as he finds
it,42 regardless of its advantages or disadvantages. However,
strict application of the Civil Law rule has the adverse effect of
impeding development, since drainage alteration is likely to occur
in any development.
Today, the Civil Law rule, like the Common Enemy rule, is
no longer absolute. 43 In fact, some jurisdictions employ both
doctrines: the Civil Law Rule in rural areas, and the Common
Enemy doctrine in municipalities." When the same jurisdiction
applies different rules to rural and municipal areas, the courts
are left with the difficult problem of deciding when an area
ceases to be rural.45 To avoid this problem, other jurisdictions
have chosen to modify the rule in one or more of the following
ways: 1) allowing diffused surface waters to be accelerated or
altered into natural watercourses," 2) allowing diversion by an
upper landowner if surface water is diverted to a watercourse,
47
41 Id.
41 MALONEY, PLAGER, AUSNESS & CANTER, supra note 16, at 597. Under the Civil
Law doctrine, it is the natural state of the land that determines the "upper" and
"lower" landowners. Lands that are artifically filled or graded to a higher level than a
neighboring land which was naturally higher do not attain the legal status of upper
lands.
" See Beck, supra note 2, at § 452.2.
I d. § 452.3; see, e.g., Dekle v. Vann, 182 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1966). In Dekle,
real estate developers sought to extend the Common Enemy rule to subdivisions in a
rural area. However, the Alabama Supreme Court stymied the developers' goal, holding
that municipalities employ the Common Enemy rule out of necessity, but that the values
of ownership in rural lands would be undermined if the "certainty" inherent in the Civil
Law rule was changed. "[Certainty as to mode of permissible use of property is one of
the most desired elements of ownership. If this certitude be destroyed, then one of the
cardinal attributes of ownership is destroyed." Id. at 887.
, Id. at 888.
E.g., Freestate Indus. Dev. Co. v. T. & H., Inc., 209 So. 2d 568, 571 (La. Ct.
App. 1968); see also Beck, supra note 2, at § 452.2(A). But see Warrior, Inc. v. Easterly,
360 So. 2d 700, 702 (Miss. 1978) (upper owner has no right to collect surface water in
artificial channel and discharge it or allow it to be discharged upon lower land at greater
volume or in more concentrated flow than would have resulted if natural condition had
remained undisturbed).
"7 E.g., Ambrosio v. PerI-Mack Constr. Co., 351 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1960); Beck,
supra note 2, at § 452.2(A).
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and 3) requiring that any modification of drainage by upper and
lower landowners be held to a reasonable use or reasonable care
standard.
48
The term "reasonable" as a modification of the strict Civil
Law rule49 is conceptually different from the Reasonable Use
doctrine. 0 Under a "reasonable care" modification of the Civil
Law rule, neither the upper nor lower landowner may act un-
reasonably.' However, even a landowner who acts reasonably
will have liability if he changes a "natural system of drainage."
5 2
If the Reasonable Use doctrine is applied, a landowner who
alters drainage does not have liability if his actions were reason-
able." Further criticisms of the Civil Law doctrine parallel those
of the Common Enemy rule. For example, it is often difficult
to tell which facts constitute reasonable behavior. Consequently,
as with the Common Enemy rule, land developers may find
themselves in court due to the uncertainty inherent in the doc-
trine's modifications.
C. The Reasonable Use Doctrine
The Reasonable Use rule 4 permits any owner to alter the
course of drainage as long as he is making reasonable use of his
" E.g., Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1966); see Beck, supra note 2, at §
452.2(C).
49 Keys, 412 P.2d 529, represents California's modified Civil Law rule and best
illustrates this situation. Keys involved lower landowners who sought to enjoin upper
landowners from accelerating surface water flow onto the lower land. Although the
defendants had indeed accelerated drainage by changing the contours of their property,
the plaintiffs had also increased the flow onto their own land somewhat, by removing
a dirt pile from the rear of their property. The court stated that California is subject to
the Civil Law rule and that lower owners must therefore accept surface water from the
upper landowners. Id. at 530-36.
However, the court went on to admonish that this Civil Law doctrine was subject
to the reasonable conduct of both landowners, and that failure to exercise reasonable
care could result in liability. After stating that neither upper nor lower owners may act
unreasonably, the court denied the correlative statement that a landowner cannot be
held liable if his conduct is reasonable. The opinion states: "If the actions of both the
upper and lower landowners are reasonable, [and] necessary ... then the injury must
necessarily be borne by the ... landowner who changes a natural system of drainage,
in accordance with our traditional Civil Law Rule." Id. at 537.
o See infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
Keys, 412 P.2d at 537.
52 Id.
" See infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
, See MALONEY, PLAGER, AUSNESS & CANTER, supra note 16, at 594-96 (New
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land.55 The emphasis in the Reasonable Use rule shifts from the
property concept of changing the natural condition of the land,
to the tort concept of the reasonableness of the use made of the
land.
The American Law Institute (ALl) adopts the Reasonable
Use rule and sets forth criteria for evaluating the reasonableness
of a particular use under the nuisance theory.5 6 Since the same
criteria are used and because the Reasonable Use rule focuses
on a tort rather than a property approach, the Reasonable Use
rule is virtually indistinguishable from nuisance where the ALI
criteria are used.
However, the ALI criteria are only guidelines and are not
used by every court which espouses the Reasonable Use rule.
Even courts which have expressly adopted the nuisance theory
may only partially use the balancing criteria, or may choose to
create their own standards for determining reasonable use.
7
However, an increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting
the Reasonable Use doctrine.5" For example, in McGlashan v.
Hampshire and Minnesota were two of the earliest proponents of the rule). The doctrine
is described in Enderson v. Kelehan, 32 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1948) as follows:
[T]he rule is that in effecting a reasonable use of his land for a legitimate
purpose a landowner, acting in good faith, may drain his land of surface
waters and cast them as a burden upon the land of another, although such
drainage carries with it some waters which would otherwise have never gone
that way but would have remained on the land until they were absorbed by
the soil or evaporated in the air, if (a) there is a reasonable necessity for such
draining; (b) if reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the
land receiving the burden; (c) if the utility or benefit accruing to the land
drained reasonably outweights the gravity of the harm resulting to the land
receiving the burden; and (d) if, where practicable, it is accomplished by
reasonable improving and aiding the normal and natural system of drainage
according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or if, in the absence of a
practicable natural drain, a reasonable and feasible artifical drainage system
is adopted.
Id. at 289.
11 E.g., Enderson, 32 N.W.2d 286; Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787 (N.C.
1977); McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo Dev. Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1196
(Ohio 1980).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 (1979), stating: "An invasion of one's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land resulting from another's interference with the
flow of surface water may constitute a nuisance under the rules stated .. "
17 See Tucker v. Badoian, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (Mass. 1978) (Kaplan, J.,
concurring) (where the court creates its own standard for determining reasonableness,
the rule loses its interchangeability with tort recovery under nuisance theories).
58 See, e.g., Myotte v. Mayfield, 375 N.E.2d 816, 818-20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977)
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Spade, Rockledge Terrace Condo Development Corp.,19 Ohio
ended a long history of employing a modified Civil Law rule
and instead applied the Reasonable Use rule. The Ohio court
based its ruling on two considerations. First, the court was
concerned with achieving equitable results. 60 Second, the court
considered the profit factor in land development and concluded
that adjoining landowners should not always have to "bear the
cost of urbanization by others engaged in development for
profit.' '6
1
Although the Reasonable Use rule may allow the "equitable"
results the McGlashen court sought, the rule may also be very
difficult to apply. The lack of predictability stems from the fact
that there are no presumptions under the Reasonable Use rule.
The Common Enemy approach and its reasonable use modifi-
cations establish a presumption in favor of the developer.
62
Similarly, the Civil Law rule and its reasonable use modifications
establish a presumption, but that presumption is against the
party interfering with the natural water flow.
63
Unlike the reasonable use modifications of the Common
Enemy and Civil Law doctrines, there are no built-in presump-
tions in the Reasonable Use rule. The rule poses questions of
fact rather than presumptions of law. As a result, balancing the
(formerly used the civil law doctrine); Tucker, 384 N.E.2d at 1201 (maintaining the
common enemy doctrine); Klutey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 766, 768-70 (Ky. 1967)
(formerly used the civil law rule). But see infra notes 141-150 and accompanying text.
" 402 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1980). This case involved a developer who began con-
struction of a storm sewer system to facilitate drainage. Heavy rainfall flooded an
adjacent residential area, and the residents sued for damages and equitable relief. In
accordance with the modified Civil Law rule, the trial court found the developer not
liable for damages because he did no more than accelerate the flow and increase the
volume of water onto the residential property. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed an
appellate court's reversal and adopted the Reasonable Use rule, whereby a landowner is
liable to another landowner only when the harmful interference is unreasonable. Id. at
1197, 1200.
Id. at 1199.
Id. See generally Comment, Surface Water Disputes in Ohio Will be Governed
by the Reasonable Use Rule Whereby A Landowner is Liable to Another Landowner
Only When the Former's Harmful Interference With the Flow of Surface Water is
Unreasonable, 49 Cis. L. REv. 914, 921 (1980).
61 See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
6, Although the case law does little to clarify these distinctions, the difference
appears to lie in the "practical question of prediction and proof." Maloney & Plager,
supra note 2, at 79.
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facts and circumstances is a function of the jury,6 and the results
are frequently unpredictable. However, this balancing test does
have the advantage of being flexible, thus keeping up-to-date
with current social values and arriving at solutions based on
current community perceptions of fairness.
65
One of the main advantages of the Reasonable Use rule is
that property concepts of easements, rights, servitudes and own-
ership, which are cumbersome and confusing when applied to
drainage law, are discarded in favor of the more flexible tort
concepts of duty and liability. 6 Furthermore, although property
concepts are inherent in both the Common Enemy and Civil
Law rules, the issue the courts are grappling with is the nuisance
created by surface water, not the ownership thereof.67
If the basic question in these cases is whether the loss to one
person from another's interference with surface water should be
borne or shifted, then a flat "yes" or "no" would be appro-
priate under the strict Common Enemy or Civil Law rule. How-
ever, since these strict rules have been modified in all jurisdictions,
it follows that the use of property terms such as "right," "ser-
vitude," and "easement," which connote something rigid and
definite to the courts, should be abandoned in favor of the more
flexible terms such as "duty" and "liability" found in the
Reasonable Use doctrine.6
Adoption of such language, however, would not solve all of
the problems associated with the Reasonable Use rule. In surface
water disputes, there are four possible determinations: (1) that
the upper landowner acted reasonably and the lower landowner
acted unreasonably; (2) that the upper landowner acted unrea-
" See Beck, supra note 2, at §§ 450.1, 453.3.
65 Id.
Kinyon & McClure, Interferences With Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REv. 891,
936-39 (1940).
" E.g., Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1956); see also Kinyon &
McClure, supra note 66, at 936. Since most surface water disputes arise over an invasion
of land between adjoining landowners, property concepts should be applied. In contrast,
some commentators have noted that analyzing surface water problems under the property
approach has proved to be very confusing since property terms have seldom been
carefully used or defined in court opinions. For example, the term "right" is used to
describe both claims and privileges. Because of judicial misuse, property terms prevent
a careful analysis of the surface water problem. Id. at 891-93, 936-37.
" See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 66, at 936.
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sonably and the lower landowner reasonably; (3) that both own-
ers acted reasonably; and (4) that both owners acted
unreasonably. Some jurisdictions find the Reasonable Use rule
difficult to apply in the latter two situations. 69
The Reasonable Use rule varies widely in application. While
some cases turn on the balancing of only a few factors, others
seem to consider much more. For example, in an Alaskan case,70
the court considered whether drainage had to be altered in order
to develop a trailer park. The issue of reasonableness turned on
the method used for diversion rather than on whether the diver-
sion itself was reasonable. On the other hand, North Carolina
carefully considers the guidelines detailed by the ALI, and eval-
uates the extent and character of the harm, the social value
which the law attaches to the type of use invaded, the suitability
of the locality for the use, and the burden on the plaintiff to
minimize the harm. 7' Finally, North Dakota succinctly deter-
mines reasonableness from all relevant circumstances. 72 To add
to the irregular application, some states follow the Reasonable
Use rule for certain situations while adhering to the Civil Law
doctrine for others.
73
III. TORT THEORIES OF RECOVERY AND DEFENSES
Although the common law property rules of liability for the
wrongful invasion of surface water are distinct and separate
causes of action, liability may also be based on tort theories of
recovery. There are three major tort theories used in connection
See Keys, 412 P.2d 529. The Civil Law rule is applied when both parties are
acting reasonably, and the Reasonable Use rule is applied when one of the two parties
to the litigation is acting unreasonably. It is uncertain what rule is applied in the event
both parties are acting unreasonably; see also Comment, supra note 61, at 923.
o Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963). Alaska
follows the Reasonable Use rule, but rather than balancing the gravity of harn with the
beneficial use, the court held that where it was "reasonably necessary" for the defendant
to alter the drainage to make use of his land, the question of whether the defendant
had met the test of reasonable use depended upon whether construction of the ditch was
done in a reasonable manner. Id. at 452.
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (N.C. 1977).
72 See Comment, Waters and Watercourses - Torts - Owners of Property Damaged
by Unlawful Pitching or Unreasonable Discharge of Waters May Obtain Relief by Statute
or by the Tort Concept of Reasonable Use, 60 N.D.L. REV. 741, 746 (1984).
71 E.g., Keys, 412 P.2d at 535-38.
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with surface water drainage: (1) nuisance, (2) negligence, and (3)
trespass. 74 The distinctions between the theories are often con-
fused,75 and indeed, there is good reason for the confusion. For
example, where a court adopts the ALI position on the Reason-
able Use rule, there is virtually no difference between the Rea-
sonable Use theory and the nuisance theory of recovery.
7 6
A. Possible Causes of Action
While use of one tort theory does not prohibit use of another
tort theory, not every court recognizes every theory. Further,
when a claim is brought solely in tort, the claimant may lose
out entirely because some jurisdictions do not allow any recovery
in tort, stating instead that only common law recovery is possible
for surface water damage. 77 Finally, every tort theory has com-
mensurate defenses that may be asserted, so that different the-
ories bar recovery in different sets of circumstances.
First, nuisance is defined as an unlawful act which causes
injury to a person in the enjoyment of his estate.78 It is generally
viewed as a nontrespassory invasion, but this distinction is often
ignored. 79 Surface water cases are frequently brought under the
private nuisance theory, since the Reasonable Use rule employed
by many jurisdictions applies the same criteria as the private
7 Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 97-101.
" See Sargent v. Lambert Constr. Co., 378 So. 2d 1153 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
The complaint used the terms "negligence" and "trespass." The court stated that
whether the manner of construction of the drains or channels constituted negligence was
not the proper test for the right of recovery. However, the court found the statement
of facts sufficiently stated a claim of relief and gave the defendant fair notice. Id. at
1155. Compare Hopson v. Downs, 340 S.W.2d 475 (Ky.1960) (where the court found
that although the Civil Law rule of absolute liability applied, the plaintiff was denied
relief because the case was submitted under the theory of negligence rather than under
the Civil Law rule). Although this speaks of the Civil Law rule of "absolute liability,"
modifications of this rule had long been in use. See supra notes 134-142 and accompa-
nying text. These cases demonstrate that the procedural consequences of the various
theories are important when deciding the cause of action to be brought.
", See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
" See Hopson, 340 S.W.2d at 477.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 D (1979) states: "A private nuisance
is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land."
79 See Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 98.
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nuisance action.'0 Surface water pollution has always been treated
as a private or public nuisance, without regard for the traditional
surface water rules.8' Thus, it is logical that harmful drainage
should be included within the same theory.
Under the nuisance theory, the focus is on the defendant's
wrongful act rather than the resulting harm. 2 However, nuisance
law does not remedy all harm caused by a defendant's conduct.
The defendant's interference must be both substantial and un-
reasonable for nuisance law to provide a remedy.83 There is a
presumption of substantial harm when the physical condition of
the plaintiff's land is affected.8 However, a defendant's conduct
is generally not unreasonable unless it depreciates the fair market
or rental value of the land.85
s See, e.g., Pendergrast, 236 S.E.2d at 787; Klutey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d
766, 766 (Ky. 1967); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 832, 833 (1979) (defining
surface water interference as a nuisance).
See Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 95.
82 Id. at 98. This theory would prove useful and timely when a plaintiff wishes to
abate or enjoin actions which give rise to an imminent overflow, but where there have
not yet been damages.
11 See also Reynolds v. Community Fuel Co., 218 S.W.2d 950 (Ky. 1949) (recovery
was not allowed because the nuisance was not deemed substantial); PROSSER & KEETON,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TE LAW OF TORTS ch. 15, § 88 (5th ed. 1984) ("[t]he law does
not concern itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all the petty annoyances and disturbances
of everyday life in a civilized community even from conduct committed with knowledge
that annoyance and inconvenience will result").
, See, e.g., Sam Warren & Son Stone Co. v. Gruesser, 209 S.W.2d 817, 820-21
(Ky. 1948); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 83, at § 88. Nevertheless, many
cases have held a defendant liable for intentional interference even when the defendant's
conduct is deemed reasonable. See, e.g., Pendergrast, 236 S.E.2d at 798-99 (the ra-
tionale behind such determinations is that loss suffered by an individual should be
allocated to the offending party). Alteration of surface water flow may be reasonable
in the sense that social utility of the action outweighs the harm to the plaintiff; but the
defendant may nevertheless be liable for damages if the interference with another's
enjoyment of land is too great to require the plaintiff to bear without compensation.
Id.; see also Wilkinson v. Charles Inv. Co., 268 S.E.2d 263, 264-65 (N.C. Ct. App.
1980).
., See, e.g., Burkshire Terrace, Inc. v. Schroerlucke, 467 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1971);
see also DODDS, REMEDiEs 332-35 (1973). Pendergrast, 236 S.E.2d at 796-99, illustrates
this contradiction in a nuisance action. The trial court entered judgment for the defend-
ants on a verdict finding that defendants did indeed create a nuisance but were not liable
for damages. The plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision. Upon further appeal, the state supreme court found the trial court's juxtapo-
sition of reasonable use, i.e., nuisance, and civil law concepts charged to the jury were
contradictory and therefore erroneous. The court reconciled the reasonableness of the
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Second, negligence is the "only theory available in. . .Com-
mon Enemy jurisdictions where acts of interference with surface
water are actionable only if negligently done." '8 6 An advantage
of negligence actions is that the statute of limitation does not
begin to accrue until the actual harm is done. Therefore, while
the statute of limitations under a nuisance theory begins to run
at the time the negligent activity first occurs, the plaintiff may
have a longer period for recovery under negligence actions. The
disadvantages of negligence actions are twofold: first, the plain-
tiff might be completely barred from bringing an action if he is
contributorily negligent; and second, before the negligence the-
ory accrues, there must be damage.
7
Third, under the common law, a recovery for trespass to
land requires an invasion which interferes with the right of
exclusive possession of the land, and which is the direct result
of some act committed by the defendant.8 Thus, when there is
a physical invasion of surface water onto the plaintiff's land,
the theory of trespass to land may be used. The private nuisance
theory differs from trespass in that the latter refers to the
interference of possession and therefore use, rather than enjoy-
ment of land; and it is this notion that justifies an invasion as
actionable without actual physical harm to the land. 9 Cases
under this theory have usually arisen when the surface water has
been diverted rather than accelerated. Generally, no cause of
action accrues until there is an actual invasion of the plaintiff's
property and actual damages have resulted. 9°
defendant's conduct with the harm to the plaintiff by applying a balancing test. Id. at
796; see also Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956); State v. Dietz,
224 N.W.2d 407, 415-16 (Wis. 1974) (reasonableness must be determined by weighing
the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the conduct of the
defendant). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979) (setting forth
the test for the unreasonableness of an invasion).
Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 98; see, e.g., Grosso v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. 1980).
" Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 98; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
83, at § 30.
" PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 83, at § 87.
R9 Id.
I See Dobbs v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 416 F. Supp. at 5, 8-9 (E.D. Okla. 1975);
Southern Mutual Inv. Corp. v. Langston, 197 S.E.2d 775, 778 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)
(where diversion and damages must both be shown). See generally Maloney & Plager,
supra note 2, at 97-98.
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Many jurisdictions further define trespasses as continuing or
permanent. 9' In these jurisdictions, where a trespass is the nat-
ural result of the construction of a permanent improvement, the
cause of action accrues upon construction of the improvement.
92
In the ensuing litigation, the injured landowner must recover all
damages which he has or will sustain and forgo instituting fur-
ther trespass actions. 93 In other (non-continuous) trespasses, the
cause of action does not accrue until the specific act occurs.
9
4
An aggrieved landowner may then recover for injuries sustained
and bring further actions as successive injuries occur. 95 Perhaps
the greatest advantage in using this theory is avoiding the defense
of contributory negligence.
B. Defenses
Various defenses can be raised to the charge of wrongful
interference with the flow of surface waters. If the theory of the
charge is negligence, then the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are frequently raised. Contributory neg-
ligence relieves the defendant of liability when the plaintiff's
actions substantially contribute to the plaintiff's own injury.
9
6
The assumption of risk doctrine relieves the defendant of liability
to the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's express or implied
consent to be subject to injury from an assumed risk. Due to
such harsh results, many states have abolished these defenses in
favor of comparative negligence. 97 The doctrine of comparative
negligence reduces the harsh effect of the contributory negligence
and assumption of risk doctrines by apportioning the damages
between the plaintiff and defendant. 98 This approach places the





91 See Dobbs, 416 F. Supp. at 7-8.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 83, at § 65.
See, e.g., Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984) (abolishing contributory
negligence in favor of comparative negligence); see also Maloney & Plager, supra note
2, at 101.
18 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 83, at § 67.
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burden of proof on the defendant, who is liable for all damages
except those which he proves were caused by the plaintiff."
Another defense centers on avoidable consequences. This
doctrine was expressed in one court's opinion as follows "It is
... the duty of any person threatened with injury to his property
by the flow of surface waters to take reasonable precautions to
avoid or reduce any actual or potential injury."' l Although the
factual question of what constitutes reasonable conduct is dif-
ficult to determine, an equitable result is often achieved, because
unlike instances of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, the plaintiff is not fully barred from recovery.' 0' The plain-
tiff's damages are reduced only by what he could have reason-
ably prevented. 10 2
The statute of limitations is also a common defense raised
in surface water litigation, 03 although it is often difficult to
determine when the cause of action accrues. However, this poses
no problems with actions arising under a trespass or negligence
theory because under these theories the statue of limitations
begins to run when the land receives damage. Opinions vary
regarding when the statute begins to run under the nuisance
theory. Some courts find that the statute of limitations runs
when the injury occurs,1' while other courts hinge their results
on a temporary/permanent classification.0 5
Finally, a right to interfere with surface water flow may be
acquired by prescription. I'0 Acquiring prescriptive rights is sim-
See Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 713; Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 102.
,01 Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 537 (Cal. 1966). See generally Maloney & Plager,
supra note 2, at 102.
l°t Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 102.
2 For discussion of this doctrine, see Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 102.
103 Id. at 104-05.
101 See, e.g., Arnett v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Ky. 1975) ("[Tlhe
controlling question is not when the bridge was built, but when the damage occurred.").
(the purchase of the property by the plaintiffs after the bridge was constructed did not
deprive them of standing).
,01 See, e.g., Dugan v. Long, 28 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1930); Kidd v. Jody, 161 S.W.2d
606 (Ky. 1942). Dugan demonstrates that when the structure causing the surface water
interference is permanent, the cause of action accrues when the building is completed,
and also defines a permanent structure as "one which may not be readily remedied,
removed, or abated at a reasonable expense, or one of a durable character evidently
intended to last indefinitely, costing as much to alter as to build it in the first instance."
Dugan, 28 S.W.2d at 766.
,06 Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 105.
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ilar to acquiring title by adverse possession. The major difference
is that adverse possessors have title to the land, whereas pre-
scriptive easements are only a right to use the land.'07 Adverse
possession must be exclusive, while exercise of prescriptive rights
may be in common with the owner or with the public. One
claiming a prescriptive right must prove actual, continuous, ad-
verse use with the actual or presumed knowledge of the land-
owner for the prescribed statutory period. 08
IV. JuDicIAL REMEDIES
The most widely sought remedy in surface water litigation is
the injunction, a preventive device which can furnish relief be-
fore damage occurs.' °9 "[A]n injunction may in many cases be
the only effective sanction because provable injury may be so
small that a judgment for damages would be valuable only as a
means of preventing the gaining of a prescriptive right by the
defendant."" 0 In order for an injunction to issue, the plaintiff
must show that: (1) the defendant's act is unlawful, and either
(2) the threatened injury is irreparable, or (3) the plaintiff cannot
be adequately compensated by an action at law."' Case law in
the surface water area indicates that these prerequisites are le-
niently applied due to the unique nature of real estate. 12 Some
jurisdictions hold that granting an injunction is an appropriate
remedy where evidence establishes that an injury will be either
continuous or repetitive.' However, where utility of the defend-
ant's action outweighs the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff,
' See, e.g., Brown v. Tomlinson, 272 S.E.2d 258 (1980); see also Maloney &
Plager, supra note 2, at 105-06.
,o Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 106.
119 Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Butts v. South Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)
(order issuing mandatory injunction reversed because appellees had adequate remedies
at law); see also Warrior, Inc. v. Easterly, 360 So. 2d 700, 703 (Miss. 1978) (evidence
was sufficient to support an award of monetary damages, but issuance of a mandatory
injunction was reversed because the right thereto was not shown beyond a reasonable
doubt and it was not shown that irreparable injury would result unless an injunction
issued).
,,2 Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 99.
"I See, e.g., Delp v. Laier, 288 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Neb. 1980).
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an injunction may be denied thereby leaving the way open for
a plaintiff to file suit in damages."
4
Wrongful interference with the flow of surface waters might
also result in monetary damages." 5 If there is a permanent
injury, all recovery - past, present and future - is contained
in one action. 'I6 The recovery may be the difference in market value
before and after the injury," 7 the cost of restoring the property
to its original value,"" or diminution in the use value of the
property if the damage does not materially affect the market
value."19 If the injury is temporary, damages can be recovered
up to the time of suit. 20 Subsequent suits are permitted if the
injury recurs.'12 Damages for temporary injuries are measured
by the depreciation in the value of the use of property, loss in
rental value, or reasonable cost of repairs.122
Under the three common law rules governing disposal of
surface water, a landowner who has wrongfully diverted surface
water onto another's land has no cause of action against the
injured party if the injured party defends himself by appropriate
action. 23 The effect of this self-help rule is to reduce litigation
and resolve minor drainage problems. Thus, the injured land-
owner has a choice of suing or protecting himself and forcing
the other party to sue.
In contrast, where water is diverted by a third party, the
general rule is that the obstructing owner is liable to the innocent
1" See, e.g., Warrior, Inc., 360 So. 2d at 704.
I's Id.
16 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
,, Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 100.
I's See, e.g., Burkshire Terrace, Inc. v. Schroerlucke, 467 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1971)
(citing Kentucky Stone Co. v. Gaddie, 396 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. 1965) (where measure of
damages is cost of repair if repair may be readily accomplished or, if not, then the
difference in market value before and after the damage)); Southern Mutual Inv.
Corp. v. Langston, 197 S.E.2d 775, 778 (Ga. Ct. App. "1973) (generally the measure of
damages is difference in value before and after injury, except where there is a more
definite equitable and accurate way to determine damage).
"9 Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 100.
120 Id.
121 Id.
22 Id. at 101.
23 Cf. Pirtle v. Opco, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (where a
landowner has the right to prevent surface water from coming on to his own property,
as long as he doesn't "unnecessarily damage his neighbor"); Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d
529, 537 (Cal. 1966) (where there is a duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury).
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landowner. To illustrate, in Lewallen v. Davenport,'1 the state
highway department reconstructed a road which caused water to
flow over the plaintiff's land and then onto the defendant's
property. 25 The defendant built a dirt fill to prevent the water
from flowing onto his land causing injury to the plaintiff, who
sued.' 26 The trial court determined that the defendant's possible
claim against the state provided no defense to the plaintiff's
suit.' 27 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had
no right to permit the state to shift the drainage over his lot,
and that in any event, he had the right to protect himself by
constructing the fill.' 28 The court found no merit in these con-
tentions and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. 1
29
Finally, the doctrine of inverse condemnation may be applied
when property is flooded by government action. 30 "The action
is termed 'inverse' condemnation because the landowner, rather
than the government, invokes the principle of eminent do-
main.""'s' The plaintiff's theory is that the governmental agency
should have anticipated the flooding and consequent injury, and
therefore should have compensated accordingly by purchasing a
flowage easement. 3 2 Courts in such cases limit recovery to the
value of property interests that are condemnable in a formal
eminent domain proceeding. 33
V. KENTUCKY'S APPROACH TO SURFACE WATER DOCTRINES
In several early cases, Kentucky applied the Civil Law rule.
For instance, in Pickerell v. Louisville,134 a family sued the city
255 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1953).





Matoon v. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347, 1348 (Okla. 1980) (where the exercise
of police power does not preclude compensation for property damaged or taken).
"' MALONEY, PLAGER, AUSNESS & CANTER, supra note 16, at 634.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
100 S.W. 873 (Ky. 1907). In Klutey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 766, 766
(Ky. 1967), the court stated that the opinion in Pickerill recognized the "Common Law"
or "Common Enemy" rule as applying in Kentucky. However, Klutey states that the
Common Enemy rule has since been "modified." Id. at 768-69.
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of Louisville and other businesses, alleging various excavations
and ditches interrupted the natural flow of surface water.'
While the court found the Pickerells' proof lacking, it did affirm
the Civil Law rule:
[W]here two estates adjoin, and one is lower than the other,
the lower must necessarily be subject to the natural flow of
surface water from the upper one. If this proves to be an
inconvenience, it arises solely from the position of the lower
estate, and in the nature of the case is unavoidable.
36
A. The Evolving Kentucky Rule
Kentucky modified its Civil Law approach in Wallace v.
Schneider. 37 This case involved a subdivision developer who
constructed roads, sewers, gutters and culverts to the alleged
detriment of a neighboring landowner. 38 When the landowner
claimed that surface water had been diverted from its natural
course by the various modes of discharge built by the defendant,
the developer defended by claiming drainage had merely been
accelerated. 139 Even though drainage patterns had been changed,
which would have resulted in liability under a strict Civil Law
rule, the court found for the developer. According to the Wallace
court, accelerated drainage was acceptable as long as the devel-
oper did not tap additional watersheds or divert surface water
- The family's privy was eventually destroyed, creating overflows which endan-
gered the family's health. Pickerill, 100 S.W. at 873.
,16 Id. at 876. Many of the subsequent judicial decisions turned on the distinction
of whether the surface water drainage was augmented or diverted. See Maloney &
Plager, supra note 2, at 82-83. Drainage is augmented when a natural drainage course
is deepened or widened. Augmentation increases and accelerates the water flow upon
lower lands because the water no longer has the land area to spread or percolate on the
property of the upper owner. Diversion, on the other hand, occurs when surface water
is caused to be discharged at different points. Diversion, even in modified forms, is
prohibited by Civil Law jurisdictions, while augmentation is permitted if done reasona-
bly. Id. at 82-84; see Wallace v. Schneider, 219 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Ky. 1949) (the legal
distinctions of augmentation and diversion are difficult to apply to particular fact
patterns).
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from natural drains.140 In Commonwealth v. Robbins, 4' Ken-
tucky again applied the modified Civil Law rule, finding that
the state was liable for unreasonably diverting surface water
from its natural course of drainage. 
42
However, one week later, the court adopted, over a vigorous
dissent, the Reasonable Use rule in Klutey v. Commonwealth.'43
In Klutey, the state sought to enjoin landowners from maintain-
ing embankments which caused water to back up onto a high-
way.'" The landowners counterclaimed, charging damage to their
property by the construction of the highway. 145 The court found
that the surface waters naturally flowed across the landowners'
property, and that since they had been suitably compensated for
the accelerated flow in a prior condemnation proceeding, they
were not entitled to receive damages again.'"
The opinion stated that the court was adopting the Reason-
able Use doctrine, 47 but the language used is confusing and
seems to indicate that the court may actually have employed a
further modification of the Civil Law rule. First, the court
addressed the acceleration of the flow of surface water by the
highway department, which is permissible under the modified
Civil Law rule. Then, it determined reasonableness from a Civil
Law rule premise, stating that "[t]he difficulty of course lies in
determining and applying tests of reasonableness. To begin with
the lower owner has the servient estate and he must accept
drainage from his neighbor'ng upper owner.' ' 48 Kentucky cases
subsequent to Klutey maintain that the Reasonable Use doctrine
is being applied.149 However, vestiges of the Civil Law rule
,, Id. at 980. The reasoning in this rule appears to be more in line with the
modified Common Enemy rule. The Wallace case thus illustrates how, in water drainage
fact patterns, the court can draw very fine distinctions, and how discretion is a partic-
ularly useful tool when applying the modified doctrines.
-* 421 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1967).
"4 Id. at 825.
t, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1968).
Id. at 767.
145 Id.
- Id at 769-70.
,47 Id. at 769.
I" Id.
149 See, e.g., Taylor v. Carrico, 528 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1975); Commonwealth v.
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remain, and its implications are still unclear.5 0
For example, Commonwealth v. Baird,5' like Klutey, in-
volved litigation with the state highway department. The plain-
tiffs sought damages resulting from acceleration of surface water
by highway construction adjoining their property. 5 2 In contrast
to Klutey, however, the court in Baird found for the injured
plaintiffs.' In Baird, flooding destroyed almost 75 percent of
the value of the plaintiff's land, thus outweighing the reasona-
bleness or utility of the highway department's right-of-way. The
court also emphasized that it was more sympathetic to awards
of damages than to injunctive relief which was sought in Klu-
tey. 154
B. Future Concerns
Whether Kentucky intends to follow the Reasonable Use rule or
the modified Civil Law rule needs to be clarified. If Kentucky em-
ploys the Reasonable Use doctrine, then it should delineate which
factors will be considered in the balancing process. Although most
jurisdictions applying this rule consider the gravity of harm to the
plaintiff and the overall benefit of the drainage alteration, 55 many
S. & M. Land Co., 503 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1972); Commonwealth v. Baird, 444 S.W.2d
541 (Ky. 1969).
- See, e.g.. Taylor, 528 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Ky. 1975) (the court tried to balance the
reasonable use of land with the gravity of harm, yet continued to preface the rule with-
"a lower owner is bound to accept natural drainage from an upper owner"-which is
clearly a Civil Law philosophy).
"' 444 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1969).
52 Id. at 542.
'I id. at 543 (in dictum, the court explained that the usual function of the jury in
determining liability by balancing factors could, in extreme cases, be determined as a
matter of law).
Id. at 543-44.
"' See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TORTS §§ 827, 828 (1979), which provides:
827. Gravity of Harm - Factors Involved
In determining the gravity of the harm from an intentional invasion of anoth-
er's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are
important:
a) The extent of the harm involved;
b) the character of thelharm involved;
c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded;
d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character
19851
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factors may be considered. 56 A rigid formula is not necessary,
but broad guidelines should be provided in order to formulate a
test that is both comprehensive and specific.
In addition, allocation of the burden of proof in Kentucky
surface water litigation needs to be rethought. Kentucky follows
the majority approach of imposing the burden of proof upon the
injured party. This is probably because surface water interference
closely resembles the traditional nuisance action, where the plain-
tiff must establish that the defendant's action is unreasonable.'
5 7
An alternative approach which is more in line with the philosophy
of the Civil Law rule imposes the burden of proof on the devel-
oper. 58 This is a fairer approach because the burden of producing
evidence can be very expensive. 5 9 The developer has better access
to the evidence necessary to prove that his development was rea-
sonable. In fact, an awareness of liability may induce the devel-
oper to cautiously consider the drainage plans in order to avoid
surface water damage.
In summary, Kentucky needs to affirmatively and clearly adopt
the Reasonable Use rule and correlative guidelines for determin-
of the locality; and
e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
828. Utility of Conduct - Factors Involved
In determining the utility of conduct that causes an intentional invasion of
another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are
important:
a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the
conduct;
b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
116 See also Comment, The Flow of Surface Water Law in Connecticut, 14 CONN.
L. REV. 601, 625 (1981-82) ("[tlhe community's interest [which] will reflect not only the
immediate impact of the development on the community, but also the broader policies
the community may wish to pursue is an important consideration for the court when
applying the reasonable use rule").
,5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 comment c (1979).
Kentucky had historically applied the Civil Law doctrine which imposed liability
for interference with the natural flow of surface waters. See supra notes 134-143 and
accompanying text.
119 Comment, supra note 156, at 622. The burden of producing evidence can require
experts to testify on complex issues such as "water velocity and volume, cost analyses
of adequate or alternative drainage facilities, and the operation and suitability of drainage
systems designs." Id. See generally Shoemaker, An Engineering-Legal Solution to Urban
Drainage Problems, 45 DEN. L.J. 381 (1968).
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ing reasonableness. The ALI criteria are at present the best devel-
oped guidelines and Kentucky should consider their adoption.
Further, a burden of proof that more clearly reflects market reali-
ties should be applied. A fair burden of proof would be to require
a developer to demonstrate the reasonableness of his action, and
Kentucky should consider instituting such a standard.
Regardless of the judicial stance that Kentucky adopts, the
standards adopted should be as flexible as possible. This is par-
tially because of an ever-changing society, but is also because ex-
tra-jurisdictional forces may play a role in shaping the recovery
rights that affect Kentucky citizens. Drainage problems are begin-
ning to receive national attention, and Congress has turned its ef-
forts toward provision of administrative remedies and
standardization of recovery.
VI. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: AN ALTERNATIVE
It was perhaps inevitable that Congress should attempt to
provide a bridge across the swamplands of state drainage law.
Unfortunately, the common law rules regarding surface water are
unpredictable and difficult to apply. Tort recovery fills some of
the gaps left by the common law rules, but tort recovery may it-
self be unpredictable and fraught with problems of defenses and
statutory limitations. Also, the judicial remedy most sought after
under both the common law and tort theories of recovery-the
injunction-is the least likely to be granted by the courts.
As a result, in areas where potential for surface water damage
is great, there was strong pressure for the legislature to provide
administrative remedies to injured landowners. Since surface water
damage is a widespread problem and differing methods of admin-
istrative relief in different states could cause an adverse effect on
commerce, Congress has often stepped in and provided for uni-
form administrative remedies. A case in point is the coal mining
industry and the enactment of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).
A. The Coal Mining Industry: Illustrating a Drainage Problem
Drainage of surface water is a particular problem in the coal
mining industry, *60 and preservation of water quality is one of the
"' See, e.g., A. Reitze, Old King Coal and the Merry Rapists of Appalachia,
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primary concerns for that industry.' 61 Surface water near coal
mines may become mixed with sulfur and pyrite associated with
coal deposits. This mixture forms sulfuric acid which then is
pumped, washed, or eroded from the mining sites into neighbor-
ing watercourses. 62 An examination of the history of coal mining
techniques is necessary to an understanding of why drainage is
such a problem in this particular industry.
Surface mining involves removal of the overburden' 63 in order
to extract the mineral. 64 The counterpart of surface mining is deep
mining, where the mineral is removed from its underground de-
posit to the surface through a shaft. 65 Since the cost of produc-
tion is lower when surface mining is utilized, it is more popular
than deep mining.'6
22 CASE W. REs. 650 (1970-71); Surface Mining Reclamation: Hearings of S.3132, S.3126,
S.217 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
37 (1968) (statement of Stuart Udall, then Secretary of the Interior, reporting that two
million acres, equivalent to the states of Rhode Island and Delaware needed additional
reclamation work).
16 See, e.g., RANDALL, GRUNEWALD, PAGOULATOS, AUSNESS, JOHNSON, ESTIMATING
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES FROM SURFACE MINING OF COAL IN APPALACHIA: A CASE
STUDY 19-24 (1978) [hereinafter cited as RANDALL].
", Reitze, supra note 160, at 653.
,3 Overburden consists of topsoil, rock, vegetation and other material covering a
mineral deposit.
" Reitze, supra note 160, at 51. For general discussion of strip mining techniques
and related environmental problems, see U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, STUDY OF STRIP
AND SURFACE MININO IN APPALACHIA 8-25 (1966). The method of surface mining most
frequently used in the mountains of eastern Kentucky or Appalachia is contour mining.
Contour mining begins by removing the overburden at the outcrop of the mineral seam.
As the mining operation progresses deeper into the mountain, there is more overburden
to remove, and this overburden increases with the height of the mountain. Eventually
the depth of the overburden makes further extraction unprofitable and the operation is
abandoned, leaving a bench along the mountain, characterized by a highwall which is
actually the exposed face of the cut. RANDALL, supra note 161, at 23.
Some strip mining operations employ auger mining methods as a supplement to the
contour method. Auger methods are used because they permit recovery of additional
coal after increased overburden makes contour mining uneconomical. Augers are used
to extract coal by boring holes into the face of the seam sometimes to a depth of 200
feet. Although augering creates less land disturbance than contour mining, it can cause
surface subsidence. This subsidence may interfere with groundwater channels and there-
fore disrupt the mining region's natural drainage. Reitze, supra note 160, at 653.
Id. at 651.
66 Id. at 657. This statement may be less true today than it was in 1971 when this
source was written. Certain reclamation procedures required by the Surface Mining and
Reclamation Act of 1977, see infira notes 175-179, may have contributed to the produc-
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During the surface mining process, the vegetative cover is
stripped away and mixed with soil, rock, and other matter in what
is termed the spoil.167 This spoil often will not support vegetation
because it is loose, unstable, and contains sulfur-bearing minerals
which form acid.'6 The acid forming by-products, commonly re-
ferred to as yellowboy, 69 readily washes down the stripped slopes,
contaminating both surface and groundwater. When this acidic
surface water enters a watercourse, it may destroy an entire aquatic
ecosystem. 
70
In addition to acid runoff, surface mining generates high lev-
els of sediment load from erosion and spoil deposits. 7' This proc-
ess, which may continue long after the mining has ceased,
7 2
increases sediment deposits which are destructive to both land and
water. Sediment reduces the capacity of the streams to provide
drainage, clogs reservoirs, destroys aquatic life, increases water
treatment costs, prematurely ages lakes, and diminishes the value
of adjacent farmland and housing. 7 1 When combined with run-
off in periods of heavy rainfall, the effects of sediment load are
increased, resulting in the nemesis of most mountain residents:
flooding. 174
tion costs of surface mining. See infra note 206, and accompanying text. Prior to the
enactment of surface mine reclamation legislation in 1966, there were few legal restraints
imposed on surface mining operations in Kentucky. RANDALL, supra note 161, at 19.
'' Reitze, supra note 160, at 652.
I" Id. at 653.
169 Id.
"0 See F. GRAHAM, DISASTER BY DEFAULT; POLITICS AND WATER POLLUTION 159-63
(1966). The author speaks of acid drainage as being a long lasting problem; a strip mine
in Pennsylvania dating back to 1815 continues to discharge acid. Id. at 161.
"I KENTUCKY DEPT. FOR NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Bu-
REAU OF NAT. RESOURCES, Div. OF WATER RESOURCES, THE FLOODS OF APRIL, 45-49
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Ky. DEPT. FOR NAT. RESOURCES]. Sedimentation as discussed
here refers to processes of erosion, transportation and deposition.
,7 See RANDALL, supra note 161, at 22. The study cites as long term damage:
- landslides, resulting from failure to properly stabilize overburden deposits;
- increased run-off which results from soil disturbance and removal of the
vegetative cover and causes increased flooding, soil erosion, siltation of streams
and water impoundments, and sediment load in streams;
- deterioration in water quality which results when soil disturbance and ex-
posure of coal and toxic materials in layers near the seam increase the sediment
load and the content of certain chemicals in run-off waters. Id.
"I KY. DEPT. FOR NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 171, at 28-50; RANDALL, supra note
161, at 67-77.
,74 RANDALL, supra note 161, at 67-68.
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The environmental problems associated with this important
industry are wide in scope and affect large regions; yet, before the
industry was regulated, the judicial system provided the only re-
course for landowners whose property was injured by a coal mine's
drainage system. Unfortunately, the judicial remedies available
were unpredictable at best.
A. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
In 1977, Congress acted to provide administrative remedies to
landowners beleaguered by surface mining problems, including
owners who had suffered surface water damage. The Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977(SMCRA) 7 was en-
acted to, among other things, control the drainage problems cre-
ated by surface mining. Although coal mining remains subject to
the common law of the states, such provisions have had limited
success in controlling the results of surface mining. 176 Strict stand-
ards of proof and causation, difficulty in joining multiple parties,
and judicial interpretation have made legislation a more effective
tool for handling a problem of this scope.
77
SMCRA seeks to provide a national program protecting society
and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal
mining operations, promote reclamation, and strike a balance
between the protection of the environment and the Nation's
need for coal as an energy source.' s7 Among other restrictions,
SMCRA requires mining operators to use mining techniques which
"I Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as SMCRA]; see
also infra note 178.
"I Plater, Coal Law From the Old World: A Perspective on Land Use and Envi-
ronmental Regulation in the Coal Industries of the United States, Great Britan, and
West Germany, 64 Ky. L.J. 475, 565 (1975-76). But cf. Maloney, Judicial Protection of
the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VAND. L. RaV. 145
(1972) (where the author discusses how the judicial system is developing and applying
common law in a way more favorable to the environment, and more efficient than
through administrative means).
I" Plater, supra note 176, at 565.
178 SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982). SMCRA was also enacted to control
economic competition among firms operating in states with indifferent regulatory stand-
ards and enforcement procedures. See Edgman & Menzel, infra note 179, at 245.
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lessen the harmful impact of surface mining on surface water
drainage. ,'"
SMCRA works under a principle of cooperative federalism,
allowing the states to set up and administer their own programs,
but only after the state program receives the approval of the United
States Department of Interior;'18 this state self-regulation is known
as primacy.' 8' Under primacy, the state is the sole issuer of per-
mits; the state authority decides who will mine in what areas, how
long they will mine, and the conditions under which the mining
operations will take place. 
82
Kentucky was granted primacy in May 1982, 81 but it is still
struggling, along with other states, to determine its relationship
-" SMCRA § 515(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1982) sets forth environmental protection
performance standards which require:
a. removal, segregation, preservation and replacement of topsoil;
b. minimum disturbance of the prevailing hydrologic balance at the mine site
and in associated off-site areas;
c. reclamation efforts to proceed in an environmentally sound manner as
contemporaneously as possible with the mining;
d. access roads into and across mining sites to be constructed and maintained
so as to control or prevent environmental damage;
e. a diverse, effective and permanent vegetative cover of the same seasonal
variety native to the area of land affected to be established on all affected
lands;
f. the operator to assume responsibility for a successful vegetative cover for
a period of five full years after the last year of reclamation;
g. all excess spoil to be disposed of so as to insure stability, proper drainage
and to be compatible with the natural surroundings and be suitable for intended
uses;
h. no debris, abandoned or disabled equipment, spoil material or waste mineral
matter to be placed downslope below the breach or mining cut.
Id. at 1265(b)(5), (10), (14), (16), (17), (19), (20), (22) (respectively).
Edgmon & Menzel, The Regulation of Coal Surface Mining in a Federal System, 21
NAT. RESOURCES J. 245, 247 (1981).
SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
SMCRA § 502(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982). Primacy applies to lands regulated by
the state. Under 30 U.S.C. § 1254(f), the Federal program supercedes a State's program
in certain instances. "Primacy" refers to the role of the state as the primary regulatory
entity as opposed to the former dual role shared with the OSM. McGraw, Surface Mining
Primacy for Kentucky: The Legal Implications, 71 Ky. L.J. 37, 41 n.20 (1982-83).
"2 The state also sets the amount of bond to be posted by the operator, inspects
the mine to determine compliance, and imposes appropriate penalties for violations. See
SMCRA §§ 506, 509, 517, 518, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1259, 1267, 1268 (1982) (describing
permitting, performance bonds, inspection authority and penalties respectively).
83 30 C.F.R. § 917.10 (1985). On October 22, 1980, Kentucky's regulatory plan
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with the federal government. A few of the problem areas of
SMCRA are detailed as follows:
(1) Federal Government's Role of Oversight. SMCRA estab-
lished the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforce-
ment (OSM).'*4 Once a state has primacy, the role of OSM is
primarily one of oversight.' 5 However, OSM may make occa-
sional on-site inspections to evaluate the administration of state
programs. 8 6 If a state fails to take "appropriate action,"
8 7 OSM
may take enforcement action - even to the point of taking over
the state program in whole or in part.' 8
Potential problems arise where differences exist between state
and OSM regulatory philosophies, ultimate goals, and value ori-
entations. 8 9 Realizing a conflict is inherent within any federal-state
regulatory program, the actions of OSM have prompted commen-
tators to observe:
OSM officials appear to have been concerned with the establish-
ment of a dominant federal role from the outset. The initial
strategy, embodying strict enforcement, narrow interpretation
of SMCRA, attention to procedure, and coercive utilization of
grants indicates that OSM has attempted to implement an ad-
ministrative strategy which stresses procedural compliance with
established rules. 90
(2) Constitutional Law Considerations. The court battles over
SMCRA are rife with constitutional issues. For example, in Hodel
was approved in part and disapproved in part (45 Fed. Reg. 69, 940-69, 970 (1980)).
During the 60 days allotted for Kentucky to revise a plan, the Martin County Circuit
court enjoined the Commonwealth from resubmitting its permanent program proposal.
Morris and Marshall, Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. 80-CI-238 (Cir. Ct. Ky. Oct. 31,
1980). The restraining order delayed implementing the state or federal permanent pro-
gram in Kentucky. The suit was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs after negotiations
among the plaintiffs, the OSM, and the Kentucky Department of Naturtal Resources.
Kentucky resubmitted its proposal which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior
and went into effect May 18, 1982.
SMCRA § 201(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1211(a) (1982).
SMCRA § 517(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a) (1982), which calls for the OSM to make
"such inspections of any surface coal mining and reclamation operations as are necessary
to evaluate the administration of approved State programs.
t' Id.
SMCRA § 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1982).
' SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
,' Edgman & Menzel, supra note 179, at 265.
Id. at 264.
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v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., 91
SMCRA was challenged as a violation of the commerce, equal
protection, due process, tenth amendment and just compensation
clauses as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The
United States Supreme Court sustained the provisions of SMCRA,
but there still remain constitutional issues for further litigation. 
92
(3) Regulation Changes. OSM regulations continue to be
modified and in some areas call for less stringent environmental
standards' 93 than those of the original Act. In Kentucky, the state
legislature has prohibited state rules and regulations from being
more stringent than federal law.194 While state regulations do not
change as quickly as the federal regulations, the state's regula-
tions may be more stringent than their federal counterparts, and
thereby prohibited by state law. Developers who do not keep in-
formed of both state and federal regulations may become con-
fused as to which law controls.195
In addition to OSM's regulatory changes, each state may
modify its program,'9 thus leaving gaps in coverage. Further-
more, in Kentucky, the Secretary of the Kentucky Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Protection Cabinet 97  issues
1', 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
,92 The Supreme Court sustained SMCRA against a facial challenge, but stated that
"this holding does not preclude appellees or other coal mine operators from attempting
to show that as applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's
regulations effect a taking." Id. at 297 n.40. The Court has not resolved the issue of
whether the procedures for designating lands as unsuitable for mining can constitute an
unconstitutional taking. Id. at 297; see also SMCRA § 522(a), (c), (d), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a),
(c), (d) (1982). See generally McCarthy, Preserving and Asserting Due Process Rights in
the Context of Coal Mining Regulation. 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 455 (1982).
, McGraw, supra note 181, at 46-48.
See generally KRS § 350.028(5) (1983).
Id. Compare SMCRA § 702(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (1982). In addition,
the coal industry must keep apprised of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regu-
lations, since SMCRA may not supersede, amend, modify or repeal those or other
related rules. KRS § 350.028(5) (1983).
- McGraw, supra note 181, at 48-49. The author states that program revisions are
motivated by experience which is gained after primacy, reactions to OSM changes, and
the new "state window" provision which facilitates revisions as long as the state can
prove that the new regulations are as effective as the parallel federal provision. 30 C.F.R.
§ 732.14 (1985).
,- KRS § 12.250(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984) (prior to July 13, 1984, the Department for
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection).
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administrative decisions in enforcement actions involving SMCRA;
but does not publish or compile any index of these administrative
decisions. This leaves coal operators and the public unaware of
how particular portions of SMCRA are being applied in Ken-
tucky. 918
(4) SMCRA 's Interaction With Private Law. Where the state
law conflicts with federal law, the federal law preempts the state
law. 19 This rule was emphasized in Wiggins v. Brazil Coal and
Clay Corp.200 which held that a coal operator whose actions were
reasonable under state law was nonetheless liable to plaintiffs un-
der fedleralSMCRA provisions. However, where state law allows
recovery for damages that would not be allowed under SMCRA,
the state law will prevail.
(5) Cost/Benefit Analysis. If enforced, SMCRA will substan-
tially alleviate drainage problems and other harmful effects on the
I" Bratt, Surface Mining in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 7, 23 (1982-83).
SMCRA §§ 504(g), 505(a), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1254(g), 1255(a) (1982).
440 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). In Wiggins, owners of a lake brought
action against a mining corporation alleging that their mining activities caused a loss of
water in their lake. The trial court found that under common law it was both reasonable
and necessary for Brazil Coal to dewater its pits in order to continue engaging in its
mining operations. The appellants then cited the SMCRA regulations as the basis for
appeal. The appellate court based its decision to reverse the trial court on SMCRA
provisions dealing with "water rights and replacement," which it held preempted the
state common law. Id. at 498.
SMCRA § 717, 30 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982) provides:
Water rights and replacement.
a) Nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting in any way the right of
any person to enforce or protect, under applicable law, his interest in water
resources affected by a surface coal mining operation.
"b) The operator of a surface coal mine shall replace the water supply of an
owner of interest in real property who obtains all or part of his supply of
water for domestic, agricultural, industrial, or other legitimate use from an
underground or surface source where such supply has been affected by con-
tamination, diminution, or interruption proximately resulting from such sur-
face coal mine operation.
As an interesting note to Wiggins, the court acknowledged that the determination of
liability depends upon identifying the source of the subterranean water and further stated
there was no logical reason to perpetuate a distinction between percolation and diversion
of waters that forces landowners to operate in uncertainty. It is unpredictable because
liability is dependent on the source of the water, not the actions of a party. The court
renounced the common law doctrines that premised water rights on ownership, stating:
"We believe that our law should reflect not only the scientific advances in hydrology,
but must also reflect the changes in our society." Wiggins, 440 N.E.2d at 500.
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environment caused by the coal industry. Newer mining methods
are being adopted, 203 reclamation of abandoned mines is taking
place, 202 but more importantly, a thorough planning of the mining
site and its environmental impact, including hydrological studies
is required before a permit is issued.203 However, one major criti-
cism of SMCRA is the inherent conflict in applying the federal
standards uniformly on a nationwide basis. 20 4 It is difficult to im-
plement such a program when there is not only environmental di-
versity but also wide differences in state governmental policies and
public opinion.
20 5
Some studies utilizing a quantitative cost-benefit analysis claim
that the national economic costs of SMCRA outweigh the bene-
fits.2 06 These studies suggest that resource allocation could be im-
proved by reducing reclamation efforts in Appalachia and
imposing taxes on those responsible for environmental damage.
20 7
The alleged result is an annual national efficiency gain of $150
million 20 and an increase in the revenues devoted to environmen-
tal concerns.
20 9
In summary, the magnitude of the surface water problem de-
mands consideration. Where drainage from surface mining is
1*1 RANDALL, supra note 161, at 23-24 (describing two relatively new mining methods,
the head-of-hollow fill and mountain top removal, which are "designed to improve reclama-
tion and resources extraction efficiency").
202 SMCRA § 407, 30 U.S.C. § 1237 (1982).
203 SMCRA § 507(b)(10), (b)(t 1), 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(10), (b)(ll) (1982). Specifically,
the act requires:
(10) the name of the watershed and location of the surface stream or tributary
into which surface and put drainage will be discharged;
(11) a determination of the probable hydrologic consequences of the mining
and reclamation operations, both on and off the mine site, with respect to the
hydrologic regime, quantity and quality of water in surface and ground water
systems including the dissolved and suspended solids under seasonal flow
conditions and the collection of sufficient data for the mine site and surround-
ing areas so that an assessment can be made by the regulatory authority of
the probable cumulative impacts of all anticipated mining in the area upon
the hydrology of the area and particularly upon water availability. ...
I See Edmon & Menzel, supra note 179, at 265.
I01 d. at 246.
1o Kalt, The Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation of Coal Strip Mining, 23
NAT. RESOURCES J. 893 (1983).
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shown to impact on entire regions, a federal act such as SMCRA
works better than the judicial remedies sought by landowners who
merely dispute a private culvert. Regulations imposed by Con-
gress are designed to be comprehensive, uniform, and remedy the
early lack of concern shown by many states. °10 On the other hand,
uniform regulations work to the disadvantage of areas whose en-
vironmental and economic concerns differ from the federal per-
spective. 21' Integrating the federal and state regulations, together
with other federal acts, may leave the landowner whipsawed be-




Many scholars are now arguing for a unified approach to water
law. It is widely acknowledged that having separate conflicting
doctrines for water in different forms only adds to the confusion
within the law; or far worse, it leads to anomalous decisions ren-
dered by the courts.213 However, there is no consensus as to which
approach should be followed. The common law doctrines in some
instances are simply born out of tradition. Some jurisdictions,
while modifying their rules, are far from rejecting the concept of
surface water as a property right 214 and adopting the Reasonable
Use rule. Other jurisdictions employ two doctrines, 2 5 and still
others, like Kentucky, are unclear as to which doctrine is being
used. 2
1 6
2,0 Edgmon & Menzel, supra note 179, at 245.
Id. at 246.
2,Z See McGraw, supra note 181, at 46.
2,1 Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What is Their Future Common
Ground, WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 8-10 (1958); J. MACDoNALD & J. BEUSCHER,
WATER RIGHTS (2d ed. 1973); Note, Toward a Unified Reasonable Use Approach to
Water Drainage in Washington, 59 WASH. L. REv 61, 70 (1983); see also Wiggins v.
Brazil Coal and Clay Corp., 440 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
2,4 Page Motor Co. v. Baker, 438 .A.2d 739, 741 (Conn. 1980) (dictum) (the
modified common enemy rule should be abolished in favor of the reasonable use rule);
Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Pourciau, 387 So. 2d 645 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Pirtle v.
Opco, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 265 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
2"5 See Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 538 (Cal. 1966) (law of California is the
traditional civil law rule, but consideration must be given to the standards of reasona-
bleness).
21 See Taylor v. Carrico, 528 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Ky. 1975) ("rule in substance
weighs the reasonableness of the use of the land drained against the gravity of the harm
to the land receiving the burden of the drainage").
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The court-made remedies are still viable and in some ways of-
fer a practical approach for dealing with the problems of drain-
age. Courts can provide a more immediate form of relief than
administrative remedies, since they reflect the "popular mood" in
their decisions, and may represent the only means by which in-
jured parties can recover damages. 2 7 Compared to legislative ac-
tions, courts may seem limited in their ability to deal with complex
problems; yet, courts supplement the enforcement of state and
federal administrative regulations. Federal acts such as SMCRA
reinforce this idea by providing for reasonable attorney's fees.
218
Finally, in terms of potential liability and protection, developers
as well as the general public benefit from local planning and pre-
development regulations.
Of the many ways to deal with surface water problems, every
approach has its advantages and shortcomings. Acknowledging
this will help in understanding and perhaps in choosing the appro-
priate remedy for surface water disputes. Above all, it is neces-
sary to correct the disparities within the judicial and administrative
forums and to work toward the overall improvement of both sys-
tems.
Anna R. Gwinn
27 See Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Common-
Law Remedies, 25 VAND. L. REV. 145, 162 (1972).
SMCRA § 520(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (1982).
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